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Abstract. Among the questions that ecosystem-based management raises for economists is how to partition uses of the many 
biological, chemical and physical attributes of marine ecosystems into sets of property rights that undergird total ocean wealth. An 
elemental basis of  property rights for fisheries involves the interplay between ecological and technological interactions, including side-
effects (externalities), and transaction costs. Fisheries management typically divides ownership by species. Divided ownership is 
efficient where production requires specialized skills and technologies and/or where interactions are negligible. When damages caused 
by side-effects are substantial, divided ownership might be used either by attenuating (e.g., gear restrictions) or excluding (e.g., 
zoning) a subset of attribute rights, provided that the opportunity (reduced output) and transaction costs of restrictions/exclusions are 
less than damages in their absence. However, uncertainty about resource dynamics, the recurrent nature of interactions, the complexity 
of numerous contractual stipulations owing to multi-attribute resources, and practical enforcement problems make it likely that the 
transaction costs of divided ownership are great at this time. Alternatively, property rights could be bundled into sets wherein tradeoffs 
across margins which promote the total wealth of a multi-attribute, common pool asset would be decided internally by a governance 
organization. Bundled sets of property rights influence the choice of organizational structures (government agency, commons, 
unitization of firms) and contracts (fishery management plans, rules, private contracts). The discussion is illustrated with examples 
from U.S. fisheries in the Northeast Region. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Failures of traditional single-species approaches (Larkin 
1996) and a growing awareness of environmental impacts 
(Auster and Langton 1999) are advancing interest in 
ecosystem-based management of fishery resources.
1 Scientists 
have identified general principles and recommended policies 
to maintain ecosystem health and sustainability (NMFS 1999). 
Sherman and Duda (1999) go further by recommending that 
science-based assessments be linked to the socio-economic 
benefits and governance of large marine ecosystems (LMEs).
2 
What s missing from these preliminary discussions is a clear 
understanding of how property rights assignments affect the 
ways people manage and use the environment and, therefore, 
                                                             
1For example, an entire issue of the journal, 
Ecological Applications, was recently devoted to 
$sustainable marine fisheries# (volume 8(1), Supplement, 
1998).  
2See Sherman and Duda (1999) for a discussion of 
LMEs - i.e., areas of the ocean differentiated by bathymetry, 
hydrography, productivity, and trophic structure - and 
references to this literature. 
the total value of fishery assets and production; property 
rights, incentives, and economic behavior are closely 
interconnected (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972).  
 
Among the questions that ecosystem-based management raises 
for economists is how to partition uses of the many biological, 
chemical, and physical attributes of LMEs into sets of property 
rights that undergird total ocean wealth. In contrast to related 
work on institutional design issues germane to ecosystem-
based management  (Hanna 1998) and to considerable 
research on single-species or single-fishery use rights such as 
ITQs (Neher et al. 1989), I attempt to explore an elemental 
basis of property rights to marine fishery resources. An 
elemental basis of  property rights concerns how mingled 
resource characteristics, production technologies, and 
transaction costs influence wealth-maximizing combinations 
of property rights and choices of contractual arrangements. 
This line of inquiry traces back to Gordon (1954) who 
advanced a theory of rent dissipation from non-exclusive 
fishing grounds which are differentiated by productivity and 
location. Later, Cheung (1970) examined how transaction 
costs can preclude including all attributes of a heterogeneous 
fishery resource into contracts, leading to rent dissipation 
along unspecified, incompletely specified, or unenforced 
margins. With few exceptions (e.g., Eggertsson 1993; Lueck IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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1995), though, the economics literature on natural resources 
has not kept pace with the body of property rights theory 
which pertains to partitioned uses of resources and to the so-
called  $externalities#, or side-effects, caused when uses 
interact.
3  
 
My paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
characterizes the multi-attribute nature of marine fishery 
resources, including ecological and economic interactions that 
can cause side-effects. Section 3 reports on the theory of 
property rights as it relates to side-effects and wealth from 
uses of multi-attribute resources. In Section 4, the contractual 
arrangements used to manage uses of fishery resources in the 
Northeast Shelf Ecosystem of the United States are described. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  A SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 
TO USES OF FISHERY RESOURCES 
 
It is necessary to characterize marine resources because 
resource attributes determine potential wealth and the 
transaction costs of property rights arrangements.  
 
LMEs are comprised of many biological (e.g., populations of 
phytoplankton, fish, and mammal species), chemical (e.g., 
salinity, oxygen concentration), and physical (e.g., sediment 
type, oil pool, currents, space) resources which either directly 
or indirectly yield goods and services valued by humans, 
including seafood, recreation, petroleum products, sand, 
transportation corridors, and waste assimilation. Resources 
which do not limit human demands  because they are 
superabundant in their natural supply or are too costly to 
extract compared to manufactured or naturally occurring 
substitutes on land do not need to be allocated over time or 
among uses. In contrast, scarce resources are potential 
candidates for government, common, or private ownership 
rights.  
 
Marine resources are not one-dimensional, homogeneous 
entities, however; they are differentiated by attributes 
associated with quantity, quality, location, juxtaposition, and 
relationships. Cheung (1970: 50) describes fishery resources 
as combinations of $the ocean bed, the water, [and] the fish.# 
A fish stock is differentiated by species, biomass, population, 
fecundity, recruitment, age and size structure, sex 
composition, growth rate, geographic location in space and 
time, coexistence with other species, and environmental and 
                                                             
3Side-effects result when an activity by person A 
causes an incidental impact - either positive or negative - on 
the property right(s) belonging to person B. The property 
rights literature uses the term, side-effect, because 
$externality# implies that the harmful (or beneficial) effect is 
inherently outside the decision-maker s consideration. 
habitat attributes. Similar lists can be made for individual 
cohorts or even individual fish.  
 
Key to the partitioning issue are relationship attributes which 
link fishery resources and the environment over large spatial 
scales. Two related aspects of relationship are physical 
coexistence and the geographic range of the populations and 
habitats. For example, Gabriel (1992) and Overholtz and 
Tyler (1984) identified assemblages of demersal finfish 
species that persistently coexisted inside large areas of the 
Northeast Shelf Ecosystem. Several species, including 
Atlantic cod Gadus morhua, haddock Melanogrammus 
aeglefinus, yellowtail flounder Limanda ferruginea, 
American goosefish Lophius americanus, and spiny dogfish 
Squalus acanthias, were members of more than one 
assemblage. Although not analyzed, demersal shellfish 
species, such as Atlantic sea scallop Placopecten 
magellanicus and American lobster Homarus americanus, 
inhabit many of the same assemblage areas. In contrast, 
pelagic species such as Atlantic herring Clupea harrengus 
and Atlantic bluefin tuna Thunnus thynnus traverse several 
LMEs in addition to the Northeast Shelf Ecosystem.  
 
Relationships go beyond juxtaposition and scale, however. 
Species that coexist are woven by ecological interactions and 
habitat requirements. For example, Link (1999) notes that 
finfish, invertebrate, mammal, and bird species that inhabit the 
Northeast Shelf Ecosystem are part of a highly generalized 
food web which exhibits extensive dietary overlap. American 
goosefish and spiny dogfish are top predators in this food web, 
consuming a wide range of other commercial species that prey 
on each other (e.g., gadids and flounders). Single-species 
management does not explicitly account for trophic 
interactions (Larkin 1996).  
 
Relationships among resource attributes also stem from 
economic behavior involving technical and price interactions. 
In multispecies fisheries in particular, harvest of several 
commercial (or recreational) species in an assemblage is often 
joint (Kirkley and Strand 1988; Squires et al. 1998). That is, 
coexisting species are caught together by the same inputs 
(e.g., crew, gear, etc. on a vessel), although the relative 
proportions in the catch are affected by a gear s species- and 
fish size-specific catchability properties and whether 
fishermen can alter the catch mix in response to input or 
dockside prices by adjusting fishing techniques (e.g., speed of 
tow in trawl fisheries, avoid spawning sites). Likewise, many 
species for which there is no market - so-called $trash# 
species, but also marine mammals and endangered species - 
are either caught incidentally and discarded or harmed by 
contact with fishing gear (Alverson et al. 1994). Finally, 
mobile bottom gear such as trawls and dredges modify the 
geological and biogenic habitat on the sea floor (Auster and 
Langton 1999). 
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Fisheries Science Center of the U.S. federal agency, the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), are suggestive of 
joint production and incidental catches (Edwards et al. in 
press). Among the trips sampled, $target# species comprised 
roughly half of total catches by weight in the groundfish, 
Atlantic sea scallop, and American lobster fisheries. Species 
regulated by other fishery management plans in the Northeast 
Region comprised a small fraction of lobster pot catches to 
over half of sink gillnet catches by weight. For example, spiny 
dogfish constituted a substantial catch in groundfish trawl and 
gillnet fisheries. Similarly, American goosefish was a 
significant component of the catches in the groundfish and 
Atlantic sea scallop fisheries, and the flounder catch in the 
scallop fishery was also considerable. Unregulated marketable 
species also accounted for a significant share of catches by 
each gear. For example, lobster pot gear caught large amounts 
of Cancer crabs, while bottom trawl gear caught considerably 
more quantities of  skates Raja spp. than Atlantic cod, 
haddock and yellowtail flounder combined on the sea sampled 
trips. Finally, catches of uneconomic species provide a 
glimpse of possible ecological impacts. For example, most 
discards by bottom trawl vessels were comprised of $trash# 
fish such as various sea robin and starfish species. 
 
Joint production, incidental bycatch, and habitat impacts often 
lead to regulations intended to restrict production.  For 
example, regulatory bycatch limits are often used to control 
the landings of species that are perceived to $belong# to other 
fisheries. Once a limit is reached, the fishery exhibiting 
bycatch either discards the species or it is closed. Area 
closures are also frequently used to exclude fishermen from 
the juvenile or spawning populations of bycatch species, and 
from  habitat, marine mammals, and endangered species. 
 
 
3.  PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY 
 
Section 2 briefly discussed attribute heterogeneity and 
ecological and economic interactions that influence property 
rights structures and organizational arrangements for fisheries. 
With this foundation, Section III addresses for marine 
ecosystems what Lueck (1995: 8) says is $the fundamental 
question of wildlife ownership: What is the optimal pattern of 
landownership when the land has numerous valued attributes 
that require property rights to be defined over different 
margins?# I draw heavily from the original insights of 
economists such as Nobel laureate Ronald Coase and others 
who have synthesized the general theory of property rights and 
transaction costs (e.g., Barzel 1989; Eggertsson 1990). 
 
At its core, $economics is the study of property rights over 
scarce resources.#
4 Property rights are the socially sanctioned 
                                                             
4Furubotn and Pejevich (1972: 1139) quote an 
unpublished paper by a early property rights theorist, 
Armen Alchian. 
and protected entitlements of individuals or governments to 
use, to change the form and substance of, to benefit from (e.g., 
income, utility), and to alienate ownership of these rights to 
assets, including natural resources (Barzel 1989; De Alessi 
1983; Eggertsson 1990; Furubotn and Pejovich 1972). 
Ownership and exchange apply to property rights, not physical 
entities:  
 
$We may speak of a person owning land 
and using it as a factor of production but 
what the land-owner in fact possesses is 
the right to carry out a circumscribed list of 
actions ... [including] the right to do 
something which has a harmful effect (such 
as the creation of smoke, noise, smells, 
etc.) ... Just as we may use a piece of land 
in such a way as to prevent someone else 
from crossing it, or parking his car, or 
building his house upon it, so we may use 
it in such a way as to deny him a view or 
quiet or unpolluted air.# (Coase 1960: 44).  
 
Likewise, fishermen do not own vessels per se; they own a 
title and permits that allow them to use their vessels to catch 
certain fish, but they may not engage in piracy or smuggling. 
The exchange of property rights involve contracts that 
stipulate ownership, the rights being exchanged, and the 
conditions and rules (e.g., attenuations, duration, 
responsibilities) of exchange (Cheung 1970). Contracts 
between individuals often attenuate (e.g., limited warranties 
and leases) or exclude certain specific property rights from the 
exchange. Government regulations also exclude or restrict 
property rights.  
 
Related to property rights is the notion of transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are the (opportunity) costs of negotiating, 
monitoring, and enforcing an exchange of exclusive property 
rights to resources (Barzel 1989; De Alessi 1983; Eggertsson 
1990). The cost of gathering information on resources in order 
to stipulate a contract is included in transaction costs, but 
production costs are excluded. Transaction costs are key to an 
understanding of side-effects (Cheung 1970; Coase 1960), 
organizational arrangements (De Alessi 1983; Williamson 
1979), and property rights development (Libecap 1989). 
 
In his path-breaking article on maximizing wealth where side-
effects exist, Coase (1960) explained that, aside from the 
wealth effect of income distribution, the initial partitioning of 
property rights does not affect the total value of an economy s 
production if information and transaction costs are zero. In 
such a hypothetical world,  property rights to all resources are 
privately owned and costlessly exchanged in markets (at a 
price) until combinations that maximize the total value of 
production are realized. In reality, however, transaction and 
information costs can preclude an optimal rearrangement of 
rights. The mere existence of a side-effect is not sufficient IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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evidence of inefficiency.  
 
Transaction costs vary according to the size of a resource and 
its complexity (Cheung 1970). In fact, each attribute can 
require a number of stipulations in a contract that affect its 
use, benefits, and exchange. For example, being costly, 
ownership is rarely complete, and the rights to individual 
attributes are not equally defined (Barzel 1989). The benefits 
of resources and resource attributes that are not covered by 
enforceable contracts are vulnerable to capture and dissipation 
in the public domain.       
     
Side-effects reveal either the absence of a contract, a contract 
with incomplete stipulations to attributes, or stipulations that 
are somehow inconsistent with marginal equalities (Cheung 
1970). These conditions result because of social or legal 
constraints, ambiguity in rights assignments, or transaction 
costs being greater than expected benefits. Where rights 
assignments or transaction costs are the impediment, different 
arrangements of property rights could account for side-effect 
losses. Coase (1960) explored options that can be loosely 
classified as divided or bundled forms of ownership. 
 
Divided ownership was illustrated by Alchian (1977: 132), a 
early and frequent contributor to the property rights literature:  
 
$What are the effects of various 
partitionings of use rights? By this I refer 
to the fact that at the same time several 
people may each possess some portion of 
the rights to use the land. A may possess 
the right to grow wheat on it. B may 
possess the right to walk across it. C may 
possess the right to dump ashes and smoke 
on it. D may posses the right to fly an 
airplane over it. E may have the right to 
subject it to vibrations consequent to the 
use of some neighboring equipment.#  
 
Dividing property rights to resources or resource-attributes 
among different owners with specialized production skills 
promotes total wealth provided that the transaction costs of 
negotiating and enforcing contracts to side-effects are less than 
damages without a contract (Barzel 1989). Thus, the people in 
Alchian s illustration might negotiate mutually beneficial 
contracts that $internalize# tradeoffs. Likewise, using standard 
examples from economics and law, farmers and railroads 
might contract ways to reduce or compensate for damage 
caused by engine sparks, a factory or airport might resolve 
nuisance levels of smoke or noise, and, as an example of 
positive side-effects, beekeepers and apple orchard farmers 
might agree on the supply of apple blossoms. Often, though, 
transaction costs preclude contracts because property rights to 
the land, air, and sea are ill-defined, the side-effects are 
complex and poorly understood quantitatively, and/or 
stakeholders are too numerous or heterogenous stakeholders. 
In such cases, a government might insert regulations that 
either attenuate or exclude ownership rights that interact. 
Pollution control and zoning are classic examples of divided 
ownership assisted by government.  
 
However, Coase (1960) and others (Alchian 1977; Demsetz 
1967) caution against the automatic application of divided 
ownership and government regulations to redress side-effects 
unless the opportunity costs of foregone production are 
considered. Ownership rights to different resources or 
resource-attributes might instead be combined, or bundled, to 
reduce transaction costs through administrative decision-
making (versus market exchange or bi- or multi-lateral 
contracts) and to maximize joint wealth. The property rights 
structure that results expands the outputs of the owner(s). 
Referring again to a standard example: 
 
$After the railroad purchases title to 
enough land to make it worthwhile, it could 
take into account the effect of its output of 
sparks on land values and profitably bring 
about an adjustment of this output to the 
socially optimal amount - that which 
maximizes the joint value of railroading 
and landowning# (Demsetz 1964: 23).  
 
The comparative efficiency advantage of bundled versus 
divided ownership favors bundling as resource complexity 
complicates contracts and raises transaction costs (Alchian 
1977; Demsetz 1967).  
 
The choice among contractual arrangements includes deciding 
which arrangement minimizes the sum of transaction and 
production costs in the system (De Alessi 1983). In addition to 
resource complexity as discussed in Section 2, contractual 
arrangements are influenced by uncertainty, the frequency of 
transactions, and the degree of transaction-specific investment 
(Williamson 1979). Williamson s (1979) essay on transaction 
costs and the governance of contractual relations specifically 
focuses on the exchange of property rights to intermediate 
products, but his results can be extended to other economic 
systems.  
 
Standardized commodities which are familiar to all parties and 
relatively inexpensive lend themselves to divided ownership, 
classical contracts (e.g., warranties, simple return policies), 
and market exchange. Seafood products are examples of this 
case. In contrast, multi-attribute resources require detailed 
contracts that are expensive to gather information on and to 
negotiate and enforce. Complexity is compounded by 
uncertainty about attribute quantity and quality. Frequent 
transactions further increase transaction costs over time, as do 
exogenous changes in technology and markets. These 
conditions favor either accepting losses associated with non-
exclusive ownership or combining resources and resource-
attributes in a unified governance structure such as a IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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government administrative agency, a commons, or firms. 
Unified governance can give way to divided ownership, 
however, once uncertainty is reduced and resource dynamics 
are better understood.  
 
4.  U.S. Management of Fisheries Resources in the 
Northeast Shelf Ecosystem 
 
This section characterizes ownership of marine fishery 
resources and contractual arrangements in the Northeast 
Region (Maine to North Carolina) of the United States.  
 
The U.S. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976 (Act) codified federal ownership of 
property rights to marine fishery resources within 3-200 miles 
of the shoreline. The Act transferred the right to determine 
harvest policies to eight Regional Fishery Management 
Councils (Councils) around the United States whose voting 
members from commercial fisheries, state and federal 
governments, and other stakeholder groups (e.g.,  recreation 
and conservation) serve as agents appointed by the Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
5 The Act transferred 
long-standing de facto rights to harvest and sell fishery 
resources to U.S. fishermen; in relatively few cases, foreign 
fishermen are allocated TALFF (total allowable level of 
foreign fishing) at a fee.  
 
The Fishery Management Plans (Plans) and related rules (i.e., 
amendments, frameworks, emergency and interim actions) 
prepared by Councils and NMFS act as contracts between the 
federal government and the fishing industry which stipulate 
producers (e.g., permits), outputs (e.g., total allowable catch 
in fishery, trip limits, individual annual quotas, minimum fish 
size, bycatch limits), inputs (e.g., number of crew, days-at-sea 
quotas, vessel size), and technologies (e.g., gear type and 
specifications, vessel monitoring electronics). Plans follow the 
Act s $National Standards#, other applicable federal law (e.g., 
National Environmental Protection Act, Regulatory Flexibility 
Act, Paperwork Reduction Act, Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, Executive Order 12866 
on Regulatory Planning and Review), and guidelines on 
overfishing and habitat protection established by NMFS. 
NMFS and the U.S. Coast Guard monitor and enforce 
compliance with regulations. NMFS also conducts and funds 
fisheries research, including surveys of fish populations which 
form part of the basis of stock assessments and management 
advice to the Councils. 
 
To date, the New England and Mid-Atlantic Councils in the 
Northeast Region have prepared 12 Plans to manage stocks of 
30 species of finfish and invertebrates in federal waters. There 
                                                             
5The 1990 amendment of the Act incorporated the 
highly migratory species of tunas, sharks, and billfishes, and 
made NMFS the management body. 
are also three Secretarial Plans prepared by NMFS to manage 
sharks, tunas, and billfish that migrate inside several LMEs 
along the Western Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico, 
including the Northeast Shelf Ecosystem. In addition, the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission has prepared 21 
Plans to manage 22 species of finfish and invertebrates inside 
state waters (generally 3 miles from shore), including several 
stocks that overlap with federal jurisdiction (e.g., American 
lobster and winter flounder Pseudopleuronectes americanus).  
 
Although four Plans incorporate more than one species,
6 and 
the U.S. federal government is the ultimate owner of resource 
rights, fisheries management in the Northeast Region has 
evolved into a system of divided use rights with scores of 
restrictions that constrain production and limit $regulatory 
bycatch#.
7 Divided use rights stem, in part, from requirements 
to attain maximim sustainable yields of individual species 
(stocks) and a political economy which allocates $target# 
species to separate fisheries (typically based on gear). 
Recently conservation organizations have advocated the use of 
mutually exclusive ocean zoning, especially marine protected 
areas.   
 
The nature of divided ownership of use rights and government 
restrictions is illustrated by the December, 1994, Emergency 
Action by the Secretary of Commerce which closed three large 
areas of the Northeast Shelf Ecosystem to fishing to protect 
the Georges Bank stocks of Atlantic cod, haddock, and 
yellowtail flounder (Closed Areas I and II) and of the stock of 
southern New England yellowtail flounder (Nantucket 
Lightship Closed Area) (NEFMC 1996). The action excluded 
all gear capable of catching these species, including scallop 
dredge and net gear as well as traditional groundfish gear 
(trawls, gillnets, lines) because scallop gear $catch significant 
amounts of yellowtail flounder#, $have the ability to catch 
other groundfish when concentrated for spawning#, and $the 
dredge disturbs the bottom and disrupts the spawning 
activity.#
8 In contrast, the lobster pot fishery continues to 
                                                             
6 The New England Council s Multispecies Plan 
manages the stocks of 13 species of groundfish, including 
Atlantic cod, haddock, and flounders. The Mid-Atlantic 
Council has prepared three mixed species Plans: squid, 
mackerel, butterfish; black sea bass, scup; and surfclam and 
ocean quahog. The latter two species are managed by  ITQs. 
7Regulatory bycatch is catches of species by one  
fishery that are considered the principle targets of other 
fisheries. For example, the Atlantic sea scallop fishery also 
catches flounders and American goosefish.  
8The Emergency Action is quoted on page 1 of 
Framework Adjustment 11 of the Atlantic Sea Scallop Plan 
which is available from the New England Council 
(www.nefmc.org). IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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operate in these areas due to low groundfish bycatch. The 
northern part of Closed Area II where the sea floor is gravel 
was also designated a $Habitat Area of Particular Concern# 
(HAPC) to protect juvenile Atlantic cod.  
 
Whereas groundfish stocks have been slower to recover, the 
biomass of Atlantic sea scallop in these areas has increased 
several-fold since 1994. The limited access sector of the 
Atlantic sea scallop fishery was granted temporary access to 
Closed Area II in 1999 (NMFS 1998). Access was restricted 
to the lower third of Closed Area II to prevent gear conflicts 
with the lobster fishery in the middle area and to preclude 
disturbing biogenic and hard substrate in the northern HAPC. 
The summer and fall seasons were chosen to avoid periods 
when Atlantic cod and haddock aggregate to spawn.  Access 
ended after 5 months when the bycatch quota for the Georges 
Bank stock of yellowtail flounder was reached; only 64 
percent of the scallop quota was caught.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Application of property rights theory to fisheries leads to 
several preliminary conclusions pertaining to ocean wealth. 
First, single-species (stock) management and its extension to 
the separate management of habitat divides ownership of use 
rights to resource attributes closely linked by trophic 
interactions, habitat dependence, joint harvest technology, and 
habitat disturbance. Instead of making tradeoffs that maximize 
combined yields, fishery managers enact numerous rules such 
as bycatch limits and area closures which constrain or exclude 
activities that generate side-effects. Probably a better 
management unit is a persistent species assemblage and its 
habitat. This actually appears to be what Gordon (1954) had 
in mind nearly 50 years ago:  
 
$Demersal, or bottom-dwelling fishes, such 
as cod, haddock, and similar species and 
the various flounders, ... live and feed on 
shallow continental shelves where the 
continual mixing of cold water maintains 
the availability of those nutrient salts which 
form the fundamental basis of marine-food 
chains. The various feeding grounds are 
separated by deep-water channels which 
constitute barriers to the movement of 
these species; ... The significance of this 
fact is that each fishing ground can be 
treated as unique, in the same sense as can 
a piece of land, possessing, at the very 
least, one characteristic not shared by any 
other piece: that is, location. Other species 
such, such as herring, mackerel, and 
similar pelagic or surface dwellers, migrate 
over very large distances, and it is 
necessary to treat the resource of the entire 
geographic region as one.#  
 
Geographic scale and the cost of enforcement are special 
considerations. Demersal assemblages might be smaller in 
geographic area than an LME. In contrast, pelagic 
assemblages are more likely to encompass more than one 
LME, but the water mass which constitutes their habitat is 
most likely too costly to own rights to at this time.  
 
Second, it is prohibitively costly to stipulate and enforce 
complete contracts for uses of multi-attribute fishery resources 
owing to their heterogeneity, geographic scale, and 
interactions.  Many attributes probably contribute to the total 
value of fisheries production in complex ways, especially in 
the Northeast Continental shelf where omnivory and generalist 
food habits characterize the food web. Moreover, no LME is 
completely isolated from its surroundings - e.g., ocean 
currents and estuaries exchange nutrients, pollutants, and so 
forth from neighboring marine, fresh water, and land systems.  
 
Third, scientific uncertainty about resource dynamics (stock 
sizes, recruitment, natural mortality, habitat, etc.) and the 
recurrent nature of ecological and economic transactions 
(including predation and side-effects) argue for a unified form 
of governance that economizes on the transaction costs of 
decision-making and enforcement. Although the comparative 
advantage could shift with experience, knowledge, and 
technological change, divided ownership of resource attributes 
would require frequent and costly contracts over side-effects 
in an uncertain natural environment at this time.  
 
Two related issues will only be highlighted here. One 
concerns the specific type of governance structure that can 
contribute most to sustainable total ocean wealth. It is 
generally felt that enforcement costs alone preclude anything 
but an administrative government agency to manage uses of 
wildlife over large geographic ranges (e.g., Lueck 1995). As 
such, the widespread practice of divided ownership needs to 
be reconsidered in the context of total ocean wealth. One 
possible regime - depending on the legal and social 
environments - is a comprehensive transferable use-rights 
system whereby ITQs (i.e., individual transferable quotas) are 
implemented in all fisheries that operate in the common pool 
assemblage. Although by no means an economic panacea 
(Squires et al. 1998), a comprehensive ITQ system would 
facilitate exchange of landings quotas across species and 
fisheries, conceivably through a centralized market analogous 
to the New York Stock Exchange. It would also provide a 
market for anyone - including conservationists - to buy quota 
or quota rights in order to protect species and habitat, 
particularly if the ITQs are area-specific.  
 
Government ownership of fishery resource assets is not 
without its drawbacks, however, including the addition of IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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substantial rent-seeking costs to transaction costs.
9 
Furthermore, government can significantly affect the wealth of 
a society by its assignment of property rights, including the 
right of transfer (Alchian 1977; Eggertsson 1990; Furubotn 
and Pejovich 1972). Transaction costs can hinder the 
reallocation of rights into arrangements that better fit new 
economic, social, and environmental conditions. Of particular 
interest are opportunities to unitize communal or private 
property rights to large common pool fishery resources.
10 
Communal ownership can be an efficient adaptation to an 
uncertain natural environment, particularly in natural resource 
societies that can not afford or do not have the infrastructure to 
delineate and enforce private rights (Ostrom 1990; Runge 
1986). In such cases, social contracts that stipulate traditional 
rules for joint-use economize on transaction costs. The 
comparative economic advantage of a commons over private 
firms (or over government) hinges on whether the expected 
value of more complete stipulation of property rights to non-
exclusive resource attributes in the commons is greater than 
the transactions costs required of private firms to develop 
property rights to the additional attributes. Innovations 
induced by alternative institutions - including technological 
change (e.g., switch from wild fisheries to aquaculture) - 
should be factored into comparisons. It is also possible - even 
likely given the complexity of natural and social environments 
(e.g., transboundary stocks) - that a blend of common, private, 
and/or government organizational arrangements would be 
needed. 
 
Finally, I have barely mentioned uses of the many other marine 
resource attributes beside the fishery, but the extension is 
obvious. It is not clear, however, whether divided ownership 
of fishery, oil, and other marine resource property rights is 
inferior to bundled ownership because efficiency gains from 
specialized production technologies are more pronounced in 
these cases. Again, it is an empirical question whether ocean 
wealth would be improved if, for example, oil companies 
                                                             
9Rent-seeking - i.e., behavior that uses scarce 
productive resources to appropriate surplus benefits through 
the regulatory, legislative, or judicial powers of government 
- is a net cost to society due to the loss of output from 
resources devoted to rent-seeking. See Buchanan et al. 
(1980). 
10Lueck and Yoder (1997) expect wildlife 
management to evolve toward unitization. Unitization is 
collective decision-making by individuals who own 
property rights to the same common pool resource. For 
example, oil companies who own leases to the same sub-
surface resource might coordinate their production activities 
in order not to dissipate resource rents in costly 
overcapitalization ( Libecap 1989). A government or 
members of a commons might also coordinate uses of 
common pool resources.  
expanded their output mix to include fishery products (or vice 
versa) and internalized the opportunity costs of pollution on 
reduced fishery output; or if oil and fishing interests negotiated 
contracts that stipulated pollution reduction technology or 
compensation; or if governments imposed regulations or 
taxes; or if the transaction costs of any of these options exceed 
pollution damages. In a related example, Coase (1960: 2) 
sums up the tradeoffs as follows: 
 
$If we assume that the harmful effect of 
pollution is that it kills fish, the question to 
be decided is: is the value of the fish lost 
greater or less than the value of the product 
which the contamination of the stream 
makes possible? It goes almost without 
saying that this problem has to be looked at 
in total and at the margin.# 
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